The Ecology of defensive medicine and malpractice litigation by Antoci, Angelo et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
The Ecology of Defensive Medicine and
Malpractice Litigation
Angelo Antoci☯, Alessandro Fiori Maccioni*☯, Paolo Russu☯
Department of Economics and Management, University of Sassari, Sassari, Italy
☯ These authors contributed equally to this work.
* alex.fiori.maccioni@gmail.com
Abstract
Using an evolutionary game, we show that patients and physicians can interact with preda-
tor-prey relationships. Litigious patients who seek compensation are the ‘predators’ and
physicians are their ‘prey’. Physicians can adapt to the risk of being sued by performing
defensive medicine. We find that improvements in clinical safety can increase the share of
litigious patients and leave unchanged the share of physicians who perform defensive medi-
cine. This paradoxical result is consistent with increasing trends in malpractice claims in
spite of safety improvements, observed for example in empirical studies on anesthesiolo-
gists. Perfect cooperation with neither defensive nor litigious behaviors can be the Pareto-
optimal solution when it is not a Nash equilibrium, so maximizing social welfare may require
government intervention.
Introduction
Medical malpractice litigation may be as old as medicine itself. However, it only became the
focus of economic research in the early 1970s, when the cost of malpractice insurance reached
record highs because of commensurate increases in lawsuits. Defensive medicine is the practice
performed by health care providers to safeguard themselves from patients' claims, while disre-
garding improvements in patients' health [1,2]. Through defensive medicine, physicians can
discourage patients from suing and minimize their chance of being held liable in the event of
lawsuits. It can take the form of avoidance behavior and is called negative defensive medicine
when the physician refuses to perform high risk procedures. It can also take the form of assur-
ance behavior and is called positive defensive medicine when it is performed using extra tests
or procedures. Positive defensive medicine, which we study in this paper, leads to unnecessary
diagnostic and therapeutic interventions, which may be invasive and costly. Theoretical
research often considers the inefficient provision of medical services as a principal-agent prob-
lem and describes its market failures as being due to asymmetric information, moral hazard
and conflicts of interest [3–7]. The literature generally agrees that physicians’ behavior does
not perfectly fit the neoclassical theory of firms, because of the following aspects [8]. Physicians
tend to maximize their profits, but they may also give up some income to promote patients'
welfare. Such conduct is consistent with the income/leisure tradeoff that determines supply in
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labor microeconomics and with altruistic behavior observed in economic experiments [9–11],
even in extreme forms [12,13]. Physicians can set the quantity of medical treatment, which is
not directly contractible, in partial response to self-interest and subject to demand constraints
proportional to the benefit of patients. Physicians can encourage unnecessary health care by
increasing their observable effort when treating insured patients [14], or by increasing their
unobservable effort and observable care to prevent patients from switching to a competitor in
case of adverse events [15]. This latter over-treatment can be considered a contingent form of
positive defensive medicine. Superfluous but profitable therapies are more likely when physi-
cians are less fearful of liability [16]. As regards negative defensive medicine, maximizing
profits can also induce physicians to under-provide services to the high severity patient if
they face liability [17–20]. Physicians can also perform defensive medicine because of fear of
reputational losses [21,22]. Stricter negligence standards can lead to more defensive but less
negligent medicine, which may increase social welfare [23], although this possibility is contro-
versial [24].
Defensive medical practices are widespread, particularly in specialties at high risk of liti-
gation, such as surgery, obstetrics and gynecology [25–28]. Throughout their career, U.S. sur-
geons will almost certainly face a malpractice claim, while there is a 70% probability of their
facing an indemnity payment [28]. The liability system influences defensive medical practices
[2,16] and the costs of medical malpractice insurance [29], but the impact of legal reforms is
still disputed [30–32]. Assessing the economic impact of the medical liability system (including
defensive medicine) is notoriously difficult because of the lack of reliable evidence and, there-
fore, its cost estimates vary widely, from 2% to 10% of health care spending in the U.S. [33,34].
The frequency of malpractice claims increased at nearly 10% a year in the 1970s and 1980s
[35,36]; since then, it has been moderately stable [28,37]. The factors that explain this increase
in claims are not yet fully understood [36]. Empirical data suggest a paradoxical positive rela-
tionship between clinical safety and litigation rates. Anesthesiology provides a clear example.
In the mid-1980s, this specialty achieved impressive improvements in safety through techno-
logical advances and the diffusion of monitoring standards [38,39]. However, empirical studies
reveal an increase between 1980 and 1997 in malpractice claims against U.S. and Canadian
anesthesiologists [40,41]. In that period, despite a nearly tenfold decrease in the anesthesia
mortality rate [38,39], the claims for anesthesia-related death in the U.S. had barely declined
[41]. This different pace of change suggests that survival improvements were followed by an
increase in litigiousness.
We explain the complex (and somewhat paradoxical) interactions between defensive medi-
cine, malpractice litigation and clinical risk by means of evolutionary game theory [42–45]. To
our knowledge, a similar approach is missing from the related literature. We propose an origi-
nal ‘defensive medicine game’ that describes, in an evolutionary context, defensive and litigious
behaviors of boundedly rational individuals [42]. The game works as follows. When adverse
events occur, patients can choose whether to pursue litigation against their physician. Con-
versely, physicians can choose whether to practice defensive medicine to prevent negligence
charges. We assume that the shares of defensive physicians and litigious patients in their
respective populations follow the replicator dynamics. When a mixed-strategy Nash equilib-
rium exists, patients and physicians have predator-prey relationships of the Lotka-Volterra
type. Litigious patients can be seen as predators, and physicians as their preys; defensive physi-
cians, meanwhile, are adapted prey who have improved their fitness through mutation. We
show that, via natural selection, improvements in clinical safety can increase the equilibrium
share of litigious patients, while leaving unchanged the equilibrium share of defensive physi-
cians. This paradoxical result is consistent with the increasing trends in malpractice claims
despite safety improvements, observed in empirical studies [39].
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Finally, we show that perfect cooperation between physicians and patients can be the social
optimum under the necessary, but not sufficient, condition that defensive medicine has no
direct benefit to patients. If this condition holds, then the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium,
when it exists, is always less efficient (in the sense of Pareto) than perfect cooperation. There-
fore, there can be a tension between maximizing the individual’s own payoff and maximizing
the social welfare, which is a feature typical of social dilemmas [46–48]. Maximizing welfare
through perfect cooperation requires government intervention. Policies for this purpose may
draw on the experience of Sweden and New Zealand [49,50]. In these countries, patients are
compensated by the government for preventable unexpected injuries, while physicians are not
financially liable for treatment-related adverse events (however, they may face disciplinary
action from their professional body).
Model and Methods
We propose an evolutionary game between a population of physicians and a population of
patients. In each instant of time t∈[0,+1), there is a large number of random pairwise encoun-
ters between physicians and patients. In each encounter, a physician provides a risky medical
treatment to a patient. An adverse event can occur during the treatment with probability
p∈(0,1) or not occur with probability 1−p. If an adverse event occurs, the patient suffers a dam-
age R>0 and can choose, at a cost CL>0, to sue the physician for medical malpractice. If win-
ning the malpractice litigation, the patient would get full compensation R from the losing
physician. If losing the litigation, the patient would pay K>0 to the winning physician as repa-
ration for legal and reputation losses. We assume, with no loss of generality, that the compen-
sation R received by the patient is equal to the damage suffered, because this assumption
appears to have no influence on the system dynamics and on the welfare results.
The outcome of the litigation is uncertain and depends on the kind of medical care previ-
ously provided by the physician. Physicians can either practice defensive medicine or not. The
latter choice costs the physician CND0. Practicing defensive medicine costs the physician a
greater amount CD>CND, it causes the patient a harmH0 (or a benefit, ifH<0), and it keeps
unchanged the probability p that an adverse event occurs. In the event of litigation, if the physi-
cian did not practice defensive medicine, the patient wins (and the physician loses) with proba-
bility qND∈(0,1), while the physician wins (and the patient loses) with probability 1−qND.
Conversely, if the physician practiced defensive medicine, the patient wins (and the physician
loses) with probability qD∈(0,1), while the physician wins (and the patient loses) with probabil-
ity 1−qD. We assume qD<qND; that is, defensive medicine protects physicians by decreasing
their probability of losing an eventual litigation.
The expected settlement of the litigation is (respectively, when the physician practiced
defensive medicine or not):
ED ¼ RqD  Kð1 qDÞ
END ¼ RqND  Kð1 qNDÞ
with ED<END. From the physician’s perspective, the terms ED and END represent the additional
expected costs of being sued. Conversely, from the patient’s perspective, ED and END represent
the additional expected beneﬁts of the litigious strategy (with respect to the not-litigious one).
The one-shot game works as follows. The physician can play two pure strategies, D or ND,
respectively representing whether defensive medicine is practiced or not. The patient can play
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two pure strategies, L or NL, respectively representing whether to litigate or not in case that an
adverse event occurs. Each player chooses the strategy without knowing ex ante the other play-
er’s choice.
The physician’s payoffs of strategies D and ND are:
L NL
D pLD ¼ CD  pED pNLD ¼ CD
ND pLND ¼ CND  pEND pNLND ¼ CND
ð1Þ
The patient’s payoffs of strategies L and NL are:
D ND
L pDL ¼ H  pðRþ CL  EDÞ pNDL ¼ pðRþ CL  ENDÞ
NL pDNL ¼ H  pR pNDNL ¼ pR
ð2Þ
The parameters in the payoff matrices satisfy the following conditions: p∈(0,1), R, CL>0;
CD>CND0; END>ED. We place no restriction on the sign of the parameter H, which will rep-
resent a harm for H0 or a benefit for H<0.
Starting from the payoff matrices (1) and (2), we define the evolutionary game as follows. In
each instant of time t∈[0,+1), a large number of physicians and patients are randomly paired
and play the one-shot game described above. Let d(t)∈[0,1] represent the share of physicians
playing strategy D in their total population, and let l(t)∈[0,1] represent the share of patients
playing strategy L in their total population, at time t. Consequently, 1−d(t) and 1−l(t) represent
the shares of physicians playing strategy ND and of patients playing strategy NL, respectively.
The physicians’ expected payoffs from playing strategies D and ND are, by matrix (1):
PDðlÞ ¼ l pLD þ ð1 lÞpNLD
PNDðlÞ ¼ l pLND þ ð1 lÞpNLND
where l and 1−l represent the probabilities that a physician is matched with a patient who
respectively plays strategy L or NL.
The patients’ expected payoffs from playing strategies L and NL are, by matrix (2):
PLðdÞ ¼ d pDL þ ð1 dÞpNDL
PNLðdÞ ¼ d pDNL þ ð1 dÞpNDNL
where d and 1−d represent the probabilities that a patient is matched with a physician who
plays, respectively, strategy D or ND.
The average payoffs in the populations of physicians and patients are respectively:
PPH ¼ d PDðlÞ þ ð1 dÞPNDðlÞ
PPA ¼ l PLðdÞ þ ð1 lÞPNLðdÞ
We assume that the time evolution of d and l is described by the standard replicator dynam-
ics [43–45], a learning-by-imitation model of evolution widely used in economics. The replica-
tor dynamics postulate that players are boundedly rational and update their choices by
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adopting the relatively more rewarding behavior that emerges from available observations of
others’ behaviors. The growth or decline in the adoption rate of a strategy will be proportional
to the difference between its payoff and the population average payoff. Accordingly, in the
defensive medicine game, the dynamic system is:
_d ¼ d½PDðlÞ PPH  ¼ dð1 dÞ½PDðlÞ PNDðlÞ
_l ¼ l½PLðdÞ PPA ¼ lð1 lÞ½PLðdÞ PNLðdÞ
ð3Þ
where _d and _l represent the time derivatives of the shares d and l, respectively. The factors d
(1−d) and l(1−l) are always non-negative, so the signs of _d and _l will respectively depend on
the signs of the payoff differentials:
PDðlÞ PNDðlÞ ¼ pl ðqND  qDÞðRþ KÞ  CD þ CND
¼ pl ðEND  EDÞ  CD þ CND
ð4Þ
PLðdÞ PNLðdÞ ¼ pfðRþ KÞ½ðqD  qNDÞd þ qND  K  CLg
¼ p½ðED  ENDÞd þ END  CL
ð5Þ
The preceding equations can be derived from the payoff matrices (1) and (2), remembering
the definitions of ED and END. The payoff differential of physicians in Eq (4) is an increasing
function of l, meaning that the relative performance of defensive strategy D (with respect to
that of strategy ND) improves when the population of patients becomes more litigious. Con-
versely, the payoff differential of patients in Eq (5) is a decreasing function of d, meaning that
the relative performance of litigious strategy L (with respect to that of strategy NL) worsens
when the population of physicians becomes more defensive.
Results
The system (3) is defined in the unit square S = {(d,l) ∈ [0,1]2}. All sides of this square are
invariant; namely, if the pair (d,l) initially lies on one side, then the whole correspondent trajec-
tory also lies on that side.
Eqs (3) and (4) imply that _d ¼ 0 if either d = 0,1 or:
l ¼ l :¼ CD  CND
pðqND  qDÞðRþ KÞ
¼ CD  CND
pðEND  EDÞ
ð6Þ
where l > 0 always, and l < 1 if:
CD  CND < pðqND  qDÞðRþ KÞ ¼ pðEND  EDÞ ð7Þ
Furthermore, it results that _d > 0 for l>l, and that _d < 0 for l<l. The term CD−CND, on
the left in inequality (7), represents the physician’s additional cost of the defensive strategy
(with respect to the not-defensive one). Conversely, the term p(END−ED), on the right in
inequality (7), represents the physician’s additional expected beneﬁt of the defensive strategy
when played against a litigious patient. Note that the additional expected beneﬁt of the defen-
sive strategy is equal to zero when played against a not-litigious patient.
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Analogously, Eqs (3) and (5) imply that _l ¼ 0 if either l = 0,1 or:
d ¼ d :¼ R qND  Kð1 qNDÞ  CLðqND  qDÞðRþ KÞ
¼ END  CL
END  ED
ð8Þ
where d>0 holds if:
CL < R qND  Kð1 qNDÞ ¼ END ð9Þ
and d < 1 holds if:
CL > R qD  Kð1 qDÞ ¼ ED ð10Þ
It also results that _l > 0 for d<d, and that _l < 0 for d>d. The term CL, on the left in
inequalities (9) and (10), represents the (additional) cost of the litigious strategy (with respect
to the not-litigious one, whose cost is zero). Conversely, the terms ED and END, on the right in
inequalities (9) or (10), represent the patient’s additional expected beneﬁt of the litigious strat-
egy (with respect to the not-litigious one) when played, respectively, against a defensive and a
not-defensive physician.
According to the above considerations, the four vertices (d,l) = (0,0),(1,0),(0,1),(1,1) of the
square S are always stationary states of the dynamic system (3). In these stationary states, the
populations of physicians and patients play only one strategy. In (d,l) = (1,1) all physicians play
D and all patients play L; in (d,l) = (0,0) all physicians play ND and all patients play NL; and so
on. Another stationary state of the system (3) is the intersection point (d,l) = (d,l) of the
straight lines (6) and (8), if it belongs to the square S. If conditions (7), (9) and (10) are satis-
fied, it results that d,l∈(0,1); therefore, (d,l) = (d,l) belongs to the interior of S and all the
strategies D, ND, L and NL coexist in such a state. Finally, all the points belonging to the side of
S with l = 1 are stationary states in the case where l = 1 (i.e., when inequality (7) is satisfied as
an equality). Similarly, all the points belonging to the side of S with d = 0 or d = 1 are stationary
states if, respectively, d = 0 or d = 1 (i.e., when, respectively, inequality (9) or (10) is satisfied
as an equality).
Taxonomy of Dynamic Regimes
The dynamics that may be observed by the system (3) have been completely classified [43,44].
We limit our consideration to ‘robust’ dynamic regimes (that is, for brevity, we do not discuss
the cases that only occur if equality conditions on parameter values are satisfied). These
regimes are illustrated in Fig 1A. The conditions giving rise to each regime are specified in the
following propositions.
Proposition 1. If CD−CND<p(END−ED) and ED<CL<END hold, there exists a (Lyapunov)
stable stationary state (d,l) = (d,l) with 0<d<1 and 0<l<1, and all the trajectories in the
interior of S are closed curves surrounding it (see Fig 1A).
The conditions in the above proposition are equivalent to inequalities (7), (9) and (10), and
imply that the game has no dominant strategies. Indeed, the physicians’ best responses result
in the following: to not defend against the not-litigious patient (because CD>CND), and to
defend against the litigious one (by inequality (7)). Similarly, the patients’ best responses result
in the following: to litigate against the not-defensive physician (by inequality (9)), and to not lit-
igate against the defensive one (by inequality (10)).
Fig 1A shows that, when the interior stationary state (d,l) = (d,l) exists, the values d and l
oscillate clockwise around (d,l) = (d,l) for any initial distribution of strategies (d0,l0)6¼(d,l),
with d0,l0∈(0,1). The initial distribution (d,l) = (d0,l0) will be reached again at the end of every
The Ecology of Defensive Medicine and Malpractice Litigation
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cycle. The trajectories around (d,l) = (d,l) are cyclic because of the signs of the payoff differ-
entials (4) and (5) in each of the four subsets of S delimited by the straight lines (6) and (8) (the
dashed lines in Fig 1A). The interpretation of such dynamics is simple if we remember that,
according to Eq (4), the relative performance of the defensive strategy D improves when the
Fig 1. Phase portraits of the replicator dynamics in the defensivemedicine game. Legend: Continuous lines represent the time evolution of shares of
defensive physicians d(t) and of litigious patients l(t). Filled dots represent attractors, empty dots represent repellors, and empty squares represent saddle
points. Dashed lines d = d* and l = l* are the loci where a sign change occurs in time derivative of the shares l(t) and d(t), respectively. The time evolution
paths can rotate clockwise around the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (d,l) = (d*,l*) (intersection of dashed lines in panel 1A) or move towards pure-strategy
Nash equilibria (attractive stationary states denoted by filled dots in panels 1B−1F).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150523.g001
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population of patients becomes more litigious. Meanwhile, according to Eq (5), the relative per-
formance of the litigious strategy L worsens when the population of physicians becomes more
defensive. These relations are analogous to predator-prey relations in Lotka-Volterra models,
in which litigious patients can be seen as predators and physicians as their prey. Defensive phy-
sicians, then, can be seen as adapted prey who have improved their fitness through mutation
from playing strategy ND to playing strategy D. The increase in the share of adapted prey (i.e.,
defensive physicians) decreases predators’ fitness (i.e., the payoff differential of litigious
patients) and, therefore, causes a decrease in the share of predators (i.e., litigious patients).
The remaining ‘robust’ regimes that can be observed by the system (3) are described in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. The stationary state that is globally attractive in the interior of the square S
is (see inequalities (7), (9) and (10)):
• (d,l) = (1,1) if CD−CND<p(END−ED) and CL<ED hold (see Fig 1B);
• (d,l) = (0,0) if either:
i. CD−CND<p(END−ED) and CL>END hold (see Fig 1C);
ii. CD−CND>p(END−ED) and CL>END hold (see Fig 1D);
• (d,l) = (0,1) if CD−CND>p(END−ED) and CL<END hold (see Fig 1E or 1F when it also holds,
respectively, CL<ED or CL>ED).
Propositions 1 and 2 can be verified by standard results in evolutionary game theory [43–
45]. Proposition 2 still holds under any evolutionary dynamics that preserve the sign of the
time derivatives, such that:
signð _dÞ ¼ sign ðPDðlÞ PNDðlÞÞ
signð_lÞ ¼ sign ðPLðdÞ PNLðdÞÞ
in the interior of the square S. Conversely, the stability properties of the internal stationary
state (d,l) = (d,l) in Proposition 1 may differ if different sign-preserving dynamics are used
[44].
Interpretation of the Dynamics
The interpretation of Propositions 1 and 2 is simple if we keep in mind the meaning of condi-
tions (7), (9) and (10), given, respectively, by:
CD  CND < pðEND  EDÞ
CL < END
CL > ED
Inequality (7) states that the physician’s additional expected benefit of the defensive strat-
egy, when played against a litigious patient, is greater than its additional cost. If this condition
holds, the physician’s best responses are to defend against litigious patients and to not defend
against not-litigious patients. Then, the defensive strategy performs better than the not-defen-
sive one (and _d > 0 holds) when the share of litigious patients is high enough (i.e., l>l), while
it performs worse than that (and _d < 0 holds) when the share of litigious patients is low
The Ecology of Defensive Medicine and Malpractice Litigation
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enough (i.e., l<l), as in Fig 1A−1C. Note that defending against not-litigious patients is never
convenient because it is costly and has zero additional expected beneﬁt. The opposite inequality
of (7) implies that the physicians’ dominant strategy is to not defend and that the performance
of the not-defensive strategy is always better, whatever the share of litigious patients; conse-
quently, _d < 0 always holds in the interior of the square S, as in Fig 1D−1F.
Inequality (9) states that the patient’s additional cost of the litigious strategy, when played
against a not-defensive physician, is less than its additional expected benefit. Similarly, inequal-
ity (10) states that the patient’s additional cost of the litigious strategy, when played against a
defensive physician, is greater than its additional expected benefit.
If inequality (9) holds, the patient’s best response against a not-defensive physician is to liti-
gate. If inequality (10) holds, the patient’s best response against a defensive physician is to not
litigate. If both (9) and (10) are satisfied, the litigious strategy performs better than the not-liti-
gious one (and _l > 0 holds) when the share of defensive physicians is low enough (i.e., d<d)
while it performs worse than that (and _l < 0 holds) when the share of defensive physicians is
high enough (i.e., d>d), as in Fig 1A and 1F. Note that, if the opposite inequality of (9) holds,
the patients’ dominant strategy is to not litigate (_l < 0 always holds, see Fig 1C−1D). Con-
versely, if the opposite inequality of (10) holds, the patients’ dominant strategy is to litigate
(_l > 0 always holds, see Fig 1B and 1E).
Nash Equilibria
The interior stationary state (d,l) = (d,l) when existing, and the states (d,l) = (0,0), (0,1), (1,1)
when attractive, are Nash equilibria. Consequently, the defensive medicine game always admits
a unique Nash equilibrium. This finding follows from standard results in evolutionary game
theory [43–45]. We can interpret Nash equilibria as social conventions [51]; that is, as custom-
ary and expected states of things in which no single individual has an incentive to modify her
choices if the others do not modify theirs. The state (d,l) = (d,l), in which all the available
strategies coexist, corresponds to the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the one-shot defen-
sive medicine game. Accordingly, the physician chooses to practice defensive medicine with
probability d and the patient chooses to litigate with probability l; therefore, (d,l) = (d,l)
would represent the equilibrium if all individuals were perfectly rational. We can also interpret
(d,l) = (d,l) as the average values of the shares of defensive physicians and litigious patients,
over the cycles in Fig 1A. In this sense, (d,l) = (d,l) can estimate the behavior of individuals in
random observations over long time periods [44].
Comparative Statics
Table 1 shows the effects on the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (d,l) = (d,l) of changing the
parameters of the model. These effects have been estimated from the partial derivatives of the
equilibrium coordinates d and l. Surprisingly, the equilibrium share of defensive physicians
d does not depend on physicians’ costs CD and CND, nor on clinical risk p, which still affects
the equilibrium share of litigious patients. Conversely, the equilibrium share of litigious
patients does not depend on patients’ cost of litigating CL, which still affects the equilibrium
share of defensive physicians. These paradoxical results can be explained by the predator-prey
relationship between patients and physicians. Accordingly, an evolutionary advantage for a
species can be completely offset by a consequent mutation of its competitors. For example, a
decrease in clinical risk p favors not-defensive physicians and pushes, ceteris paribus, the share
of defensive physicians below its equilibrium level; therefore, the fitness of litigious patients
improves (with respect to not-litigious ones) and their equilibrium share l permanently
The Ecology of Defensive Medicine and Malpractice Litigation
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0150523 March 16, 2016 9 / 15
increases. When the population of patients becomes more litigious, the fitness of defensive
physicians improves (with respect to not-defensive ones) and the share of defensive physicians
goes back to its initial equilibrium value d. Increasing safety in clinical practice, then, may not
affect the level of defensive medicine in the long run, but it can increase malpractice litigation
against physicians when adverse events occur. Similarly, lowering legal costs CL will not affect
the equilibrium share of litigious patients l, because the upwards pressure on the share of liti-
gious patients will be contained by a permanent increase in the equilibrium share of defensive
physicians d. Note that a decrease in legal costs CL may be associated with a reduction in
patients’ compensation R; for example, when contingency fees give the successful attorneys a
percentage of the compensation awarded in favor of their clients, the equilibrium share of liti-
gious patients l can permanently increase, while that of defensive physicians d can move
either upwards or downwards if, respectively, the change in CL or R is predominant.
Welfare Analysis
We compare the stationary states of the game in terms of welfare. A state is more efficient (in
the economic sense of Pareto) than another state if, when moving from the former to the latter,
the welfare of at least one individual decreases. We measure welfare by means of the population
average payoffsPPH(d,l) andPPA(d,l), which correspond, at the stationary states of our
dynamic system, to the expected individual payoffs of physicians and patients, respectively.
The following two propositions illustrate the most interesting results (see S1 Appendix for
proofs).
Proposition 3. When the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (d,l) = (d,l) exists (see Fig 1A),
thenPPH(0,0)>PPH(d,l) always holds; furthermore, it results thatPPA(0,0)PPA(d,l) if
H0.
Table 1. Effects on the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (d,l) = (d*,l*) of an increase in parameters
value.
Effect on equilibrium shares











Legend:%: increasing;&: decreasing;$: independent; d*: share of defensive physicians; l*: share of
litigious patients; p: probability of adverse events during medical treatment; qD, qND: physician’s
probabilities of losing a litigation when, respectively, defending or not; R: what a losing physician pays to
the litigious patient; K: what a not-losing physician receives from the litigious patient; CD, CND: physician’s
costs of, respectively, defending or not; CL: patient’s cost of litigating; ED, END: expected settlement of the
litigation when, respectively, the physician defends or not. Counter-intuitively, the predator-prey relationship
makes l* independent from cost CL, and d* independent from clinical risk p and from costs CND and CD.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0150523.t001
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According to Proposition 3, the equilibrium (d,l) = (d,l) can never be more efficient than
the non-attractive stationary state with perfect cooperation (d,l) = (0,0), while (d,l) = (0,0) is
always more efficient than the state (d,l) = (d,l) whenever defensive medicine has no direct
benefit to patients (i.e., when H0). Remember that, according to the replicator dynamics [44],
d and l represent the time averages of the shares d and l, respectively, over the closed trajecto-
ries in Fig 1A. Then,PPH(d,l) andPPA(d,l) measure the average values along these trajec-
tories ofPPH(d,l) andPPA(d,l), respectively. Consequently, the results in Proposition 3 can
also be used to compare, in terms of welfare, the stationary state (d,l) = (0,0) and the closed tra-
jectories around (d,l) = (d,l).
Proposition 4. It results thatPPH(0,0)PPH(1,1) andPPA(0,0)PPA(1,1) if, respectively,
(see inequality (10)):
CD  CND  p ED ð11Þ




When the stationary state (d,l) = (1,1) is attractive (see Proposition 2 and Fig 1B), inequality
(11) always holds, while inequality (12) holds for high enough ratiosH/p, because ED is positive
according to Proposition 2; therefore, the state (d,l) = (0,0) is more efficient than (d,l) = (1,1)
for high enough ratios H/p (see S1 Appendix for proof).
Finally, we present an illustrative example of calculation of the price of anarchy, which is a
measure of how the efficiency of a system degrades due to selfish behavior of its agents [52,53].
For brevity, we consider only the case that arises when the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (d,
l) = (d,l) exists (see Proposition 1) and is Pareto-dominated by the state of perfect coopera-
tion (d,l) = (0,0) (see Proposition 3), when the latter is also the social optimum (see S2 Appen-
dix for conditions). In this particular case, the payoffs of all agents are always negative;
therefore, the price of anarchy can be computed as the ratio between the social welfare at the
Nash equilibrium (d,l) = (d,l) and at the social optimum (d,l) = (0,0). We measure social wel-
fare by means of the classic utilitarian or Benthamite social welfare function; that is, as the sum
of the population average payoffs of physicians and patients at any given state. These popula-
tion average payoffs correspond, in both states, to the expected individual payoffs of physicians
and patients. Accordingly, the price of anarchy results in the following:
PoA ¼ PPHðd
; lÞ þPPAðd; lÞ
PPHð0; 0Þ þPPAð0; 0Þ
¼ ENDðCD  CNDÞ þ HðEND  CLÞðEND  EDÞðCND þ RpÞ
þ 1
The price of anarchy in the previous equation is negatively correlated to the patient’s costs
of litigation CL, because it also results that H0; therefore, in such a specific scenario, the pol-
icy-maker can improve efficiency by raising these legal costs.
Discussion
This paper has studied the interactions between defensive medicine, malpractice litigation and
clinical risk by means of evolutionary game theory. We proposed an original ‘defensive medi-
cine game’ played by physicians and patients, which explains the paradoxical positive relation-
ship between clinical safety and litigation rates observed in empirical studies [40,41]. Using the
replicator dynamics, we modelled the time evolution of litigious patients and defensive physi-
cians. We classified the dynamic regimes, found the equilibria and compared the equilibria in
terms of welfare and efficiency. The most interesting dynamic regime has a mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium and exhibits predator-prey interactions typical of ecological models.
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Accordingly, an evolutionary advantage for a species can be completely offset by a consequent
mutation of its competitors, with paradoxical consequences. A decrease in clinical risk pushes,
ceteris paribus, the share of defensive physicians below its equilibrium; in turn, the abundance
of vulnerable prey improves the predators’ fitness, so the equilibrium share of litigious patients
permanently increases until the share of defensive physicians returns to its initial equilibrium.
This interaction can explain why increasing safety in clinical practice may not affect the level of
defensive medicine in the long run, but it can increase malpractice litigation against physicians
when adverse events occur. Our explanation is complementary to that based on the traditional
argument proposed earlier by Mechanic [54]. According to the latter, increasing clinical safety
may lead to an increase in patients’ expectations about the quality of health care; if the increase
in expectations is too high to meet the actual quality of health care, then patients are more
likely to become litigious. We believe that these two explanations can easily coexist. Indeed,
our counterintuitive evolutionary findings and the traditional justification based on patients’
unrealistic expectations can both play a role in explaining the lack of negative correlation
between clinical safety and patients’ litigiousness.
We concluded our analysis by comparing the possible equilibria of the game in terms of effi-
ciency and welfare. When defensive medicine has no direct benefit to patients, perfect coopera-
tion between physicians and patients is always more efficient than any mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium in which the non-cooperative strategies are partially played. When the harm for
patients from defensive medicine is high enough, perfect cooperation is also more efficient
than the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in which everybody litigates or defends. The pre-
ceding welfare properties depend crucially on the assumption that defensive medicine is not
beneficial for patients (although the population dynamics remain exactly the same regardless
of the harmful or beneficial effects of defensive medicine on patients). Conversely, when defen-
sive medicine provides benefit to patients, they can improve their welfare through litigation at
the expense of physicians, who should resort to practicing defensive medicine (thus imposing
an additional medical effort on them).
The model can be adapted to different concepts of defensive medicine in literature and to
other cases of the over-provision of care [2,16]. The relationship between patients and specific
health professionals (for example, the family doctor) is often characterized by repeated interac-
tions; this feature can promote altruistic behavior [55] because people tend to internalize oth-
ers’ perceptions and goals by repeated social contact [56]. Altruism can be introduced in our
model in the form of utility interdependence between players, so that the altruist’s utility is a
weighted average of her own payoff and of the other player’s payoff [57]. If agents are altruistic,
then they will consider (at least to some extent) the effects of their decision on the welfare of
the other players. Therefore, cooperation is more likely to occur, even in the absence of coordi-
nation. We do not specifically address the ethical and psychological drivers of agents’ behav-
iors, which can be relevant [22,58].
Our results would be unchanged if we assumed that patients were assisted by lawyers oper-
ating under perfect competition conditions. Indeed, a perfectly competitive market would push
lawyers’ fees to their marginal cost, and such identical compensation is implicitly included in
the model parameters. Also, lawyers paid on a contingency basis might directly replace patients
in the game, with minor changes in parameters. Extending the game to lawyers would be suit-
able to study the impact of information asymmetry on defensive medicine and malpractice set-
tlement costs, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
The possible cyclic dynamics of our model may suggest additional explanations to the
observed fluctuations in prices of malpractice insurance [59], which are also attributable to
underwriting cycles in the insurance market [60].
The Ecology of Defensive Medicine and Malpractice Litigation
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0150523 March 16, 2016 12 / 15
The policy implications of our study are various. First, policy-makers should consider the
overall underlying dynamics of defensive medicine and malpractice litigation rather than their
irregular (and sometimes misleading) short-term trends. Second, because of the predator-prey
relationship, clinical advances and legal reforms can have unexpected long-term consequences
on the frequency of defensive medicine and malpractice claims. Third, increasing safety in clin-
ical practice can increase the risk for physicians of being sued by patients when accidents
occur. Fourth, perfect cooperation can be the social optimum when it is not a Nash equilib-
rium; therefore, government intervention is needed to maximize social welfare. Policies for this
purpose may draw on the experience of Sweden and New Zealand, where physicians are not
financially liable for treatment-related adverse events [49,50]. However, evaluating optimal
policies still requires more research.
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